Two articles about Buster Bombs that caught my eye Updated: Events overtook me as I was writing this 15 minutes ago

The first is by David Strom, who is, in my experience reading his work over the past few years, solid and not given to hyperbole.

Fordow Could Be a Tougher Nut to Crack Than Most People Think

A conventional wisdom has developed that only the United States has the capacity to destroy Iran's nuclear enrichment facility at Fordow, and that the US most certainly does have that capability. 

But what if that second assumption is false? Could it be that Iran's Fordow enrichment site is actually not vulnerable to destruction from the air?

Unfortunately, the answer is that it could be so. Not that it IS so, but the common assumption that only depth and layers of rock and concrete are the obstacles an airstrike would face is likely incorrect. 

No, I am not talking about impregnable air defenses or anything so easily dealt with. The layered defenses that everybody assumes are the only other obstacles really are not significant problems for the United States. By the time any B-2 bombers reached Fordow the US and Israel will likely have total air supremacy, and any remnant air defenses would be unlikely to present much of a threat. 

It is the nature of Fordow itself that is the problem. The farther down the rabbit hole I dig, the more obvious it becomes that removing Fordow from the board for a long time will be very, very difficult. 

…. This may be why Trump has been hesitating to actually deploy it. He hopes Iran will surrender its nuclear program without having to test the MOP in combat against such a difficult target. We know it works in testing. We don't know if it will do the job we want it to do right here, right now. 

The article goes on at length explaining why the task is so complicated but, bottom line, it may take many more than just the two bombs the media’s been talking about, and it may not succeed regardless. Read the whole thing.

The second article was written by a retired general, and we’ve learned at least since the Vietnam War that generals can be wrong almost as often as Washington “experts”, so who knows? I certainly don’t have the technical background to evaluate his argument, but it;s interesting. And I remember Iraq.

ROBERT MAGINNIS: Don’t be misled—Iran isn’t days away from a nuclear bomb

As tensions between Israel and Iran escalate, the airwaves are full of alarmist commentary. Military analysts and political leaders alike are warning that Tehran is "on the brink" of possessing a nuclear weapon. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt even claimed, "Iran has all that it needs to achieve a nuclear weapon … and it would take a couple weeks to complete the production of that weapon." This is not just a misstatement. It is misinformation—and it risks pushing the United States into a hasty and unjustified war.

The reality is far more complex. Enriched uranium—even at weapons-grade levels—is only one component of a long, technically demanding process required to create a functional nuclear bomb. Understanding why this alarmism is premature requires a clear breakdown of what’s actually involved in building such a device.

According to U.S. experts and declassified intelligence assessments, a nuclear weapon requires at least the following elements:

  1. Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU): Iran would need U-235 enriched to 90%, but that alone is insufficient.

  2. Precision Shaping: The uranium must be machined into a flawless sphere, requiring high-end metallurgy and computing.

  3. Explosive Lenses: Carefully placed charges must detonate simultaneously to compress the core—a method called implosion.

  4. Trigger Mechanisms: These detonators must be precisely synchronized; even a microsecond delay renders the weapon ineffective.

  5. Reflectors and Tampers: Elements like beryllium are required to maintain compression and sustain the chain reaction.

  6. Weaponization: The bomb must be ruggedized into a functional assembly, including casing and electronics that can survive delivery.

  7. Delivery Systems: The weapon must be fitted onto a missile, aircraft, or another platform capable of reaching its target.

“In addition to enriched uranium and implosion mechanisms, a functional nuclear weapon requires several other complex components that Iran has not demonstrably mastered. These include a neutron initiator to trigger the chain reaction, precision fusing and arming systems, and reentry vehicle technology if the weapon is to be missile-delivered. A credible nuclear arsenal also demands sub-critical testing infrastructure to validate design functionality and safety protocols to control explosive yield. These technical requirements involve advanced engineering, testing, and materials—none of which are confirmed to exist in Iran’s program today.”

Like Strom’s article, this one is worth reading in its entirety.