Theodore Dalrymple addresses Britain’s woes in this essay, but it can be easily transported across the pond

Excellent article. Two short excerpts:

Britain’s Crisis of Governance

Wherever one looks, one sees the same pattern of self-mutilating government decision-making. Paralysis struggles with chaos for dominance. A high-speed rail line between London, Manchester, and Leeds was first proposed in 2009 and approved in 2012. Yet the first trains—on the truncated route between London and Birmingham—are not expected to run until sometime between 2033 and 2036. If the project’s habitual delays are any guide, the later date would be the safer prediction.

Japan inaugurated its first high-speed rail line in 1964, Italy in 1977, France in 1981, Spain in 1992, China in 2008, and even Morocco by 2018. France took just seven years to build the line between Paris and Lyon; Britain, by contrast, will take at least 21 years to build a line less than half as long. The difference can hardly be explained by concern for passenger safety: in the 45 years since the TGV (train à grande vitesse) entered service, no passenger has ever been killed on one, and the system now extends over 1,700 miles of track.

It will cost Britain about twice as much, and take appreciably longer, to build the line from London to Birmingham (with a possible extension to Manchester, not expected to open until 2040) as Spain spent building its entire 2,500-mile high-speed rail network, second only to China’s in length. Admittedly, rail lines are more difficult and costly to build in densely populated countries, but that can hardly explain a cost per mile more than 20 times as high.

I leave aside whether, from a purely economic point of view, a high-speed line between London and Manchester was ever a wise investment. Fast and comfortable trains are delightful for passengers, but seldom in human history—given modern electronic means of communication—has it been less economically necessary to cut 45 minutes from such a journey. My point is that the episode demonstrates the country’s administrative incapacity: chaotic and paralytic at the same time.

Wherever one looks in Britain, one sees the division of responsibilities, the proliferation of organizations, and the multiplication of procedures, supposedly to prevent mistakes or corruption but, in reality, manifestations of what one could call legalized corruption. The official British inquiry into the handling of the Covid-19 pandemic will, by the time it concludes, have taken more than four years and cost 200 times as much as Sweden’s, which reported after just two years. Does anyone imagine that its findings will therefore be 200 times as thorough, wise, honest, or intellectually sound because it cost 200 times as much? On the contrary, like most modern official inquiries, the British inquiry became a trough at which lawyers, officials, and experts could feed.

The effects of this legal corruption are evident throughout the administration. Though Britain spends more on defense than France, for example, it was recently unable to deploy a single ship during the crisis in the Persian Gulf, while France deployed seven. The Ministry of Defence employs over 75 percent more bureaucrats than the Royal Navy has sailors. One might call this, metaphorically, the Bolivianization of the Royal Navy: all admirals and no ships—though the Bolivians have at least the excuse of having no coastline.